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Compulsory Corporate Cyber-Liability
Insurance: Outsourcing Data Privacy Regulation
to Prevent and Mitigate Data Breaches
Minhquang N. Trang*
INTRODUCTION
This article will recommend that hospitals, banks, and
major corporations be compelled to purchase cyber-liability
insurance in order to outsource corporate cybersecurity
regulation to the insurance industry. The ever-expanding
nature of cyber threats makes them difficult for federal
agencies to regulate with the limited resources available.1 A
compulsory cyber-liability regime ensures that modern,
updated cybersecurity standards are implemented to help
prevent data breaches and mitigate damages.
Cyber-attacks that target personal, private information are
increasing in frequency and are difficult to prevent entirely.2
FBI Director James Comey stated that there are two kinds of
big companies in the United States . . . those whove been
hacked . . . and those who dont know theyve been hacked.3
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1. See generally Cyber-Attacks: Threats, Regulatory Reaction and
Practical Proactive Measures to Help Avoid Risk, KATTEN L. (June 24, 2015),
https://www.kattenlaw.com/Cyber-Attacks-Threats-Regulatory-Reaction-and-
Practical-Proactive-Measures-to-Help-Avoid-Risks (discussing the current
status of cyber threats, the regulations that seek to prevent them, and
suggested legislative action going forward).
2. See STEVEN R. GILFORD, PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY: A GUIDE TO
PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAW IN THE INFORMATION AGE § 16:1 (Kristen J.
Matthews ed., 2016); see also The Cost and Frequency of Cyber Attacks on the
Rise, HELP NET SECURITY (Oct. 9, 2013), https://www.helpnetsecurity.com
/2013/10/09/the-cost-and-frequency-of-cyber-attacks-on-the-rise/.
3. See James Cook, FBI Director: China Has Hacked Every Big US
Company, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/fbi-
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Because corporate cyber-attacks may significantly harm the
public through the unintended disclosure of private
information4, this article will explore compulsory cyber-liability
insurance and the benefits of having the insurance industry act
as a private regulator.
Businesses operations are dependent on data and
information technology.5 Corporations collect and store
sensitive and personal information from millions of consumers,
including credit card information, social security numbers, and
even medical history.6 According to NetDiligence,7 personal
information was improperly exposed in eighty-six percent of
data breaches in 2015.8 The SANS Institute9 estimates that
over fifty-three million people had their personal information
exposed in 2005.10 Hackers use the personal information for
illegal purposes that harm those who identify with that
director-china-has-hacked-every-big-us-company-2014-10 (citing FBI Director
James Comeys remarks concerning international hacking by Chinese
hackers).
4. Cyber Claims Study, NETDILIGENCE 3 (2015), https://netdiligence.com
/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/NetDiligence_2015_Cyber_Claims_Study_093015
.pdf (noting that the healthcare sector experiences the second largest amount
of breaches (21% of total breaches), followed by the financial sector (17% of
total breaches)).
5. PWC, INSURANCE 2020 & BEYOND: REAPING THE DIVIDENDS OF CYBER
RESILIENCE 7 (2015), http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/insurance/publications/assets
/reaping-dividends-cyber-resilience.pdf (The digital revolution has created a
highly interconnected world that is awash with data, much of it sensitive.);
see also GUIDE FOR CONDUCTING RISK ASSESSMENTS, NATL INST. OF
STANDARDS & TECH. 1 (Sept. 2012), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy
/SP/nistspecialpublication800-30r1.pdf (Organizations in the public and
private sectors depend on information technology.).
6. See Cyber Claims Study, supra note 4, at 11; see also NATL INST. OF
STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 5, app. B, at B-7 (suggesting certain
standards companies should adopt in their data protection regimes).
7. NetDiligence is a privately held cyber risk assessment and data
breach services company. See About, NETDILIGENCE, http://netdiligence.com
/pages/about/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).
8. NETDILIGENCE, supra note 4, at 3.
9. The SANS Institute is a cooperative research and education
organization in security. The organization has trained more than 165,000
security professionals around the world. See About, SANS INST.,
https://www.sans.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).
10. Peter Gordon, Data Leakage  Threats and Mitigation, SANS INST. 18
(Oct. 15, 2007), https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/awareness
/data-leakage-threats-mitigation-1931.
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information.11 For example, cybercriminals may sell stolen
information on black markets, use the information to access
bank accounts, extort companies, or trade on insider
information.12 Occasionally, employees inadvertently cause a
security incident,13 which can be as devastating as an
intentional, malicious hack.14 Cybercrimes can be costly and
challenging to detect.15
As a result, companies experience business interruptions
and are then incapable of meeting contractual obligations when
their data is lost or distorted.16 Cyber breaches may account for
more than $400 billion in losses annually.17 Corporate boards of
directors face both class action lawsuits filed by those who had
their private information stolen and suits filed by affected
11. Id. at 1819 (discussing hacker use of stolen credit card and other
personal information).
12. See BURT WELLS ET AL., 4 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW &
PRACTICE § 29.01[2][a][iv] (Jeffrey E. Thomas ed., 2016).
13. A security incident is an event that violates an organizations
security or privacy policies involving sensitive information. Rick Kam, Whats
in a Name? Defining Event vs. Security Incident vs. Data Breach, IDEXPERTS
(July 8, 2015), https://www2.idexpertscorp.com/blog/single/whats-in-a-name-
defining-event-vs.-security-incident-vs.-data-breach. Data breaches are a
serious type of security incident that involves the release of personally
sensitive, protected and/or confidential data. A small percentage of security
incidents escalate into data breaches. See id.; Kate Brew, Whats the Difference
Between a Data Breach and a Security Incident?, ALIEN VAULT (Dec. 30, 2014),
https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/security-essentials/whats-the-difference-
between-a-data-breach-and-a-security-incident.
14. See NATL INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 5, at 10
(explaining how predisposing conditions that exist within an organization,
such as lack of employee training, increases the likelihood of cyber-attacks);
see also David Emm et al., IT Threat Evolution in Q2 2015, KASPERSKY LAB 4
(July 30, 2015), https://securelist.com/analysis/quarterly-malware-reports
/71610/it-threat-evolution-q2-2015/ (demonstrating how cyber espionage
hacker CozyDuke used malware emails in ways that encourage employees to
distribute the malware to other employees by embedding the malware in a
funny video stream).
15. See generally Gordon M. Snow, Assistant Dir. Cyber Div., Statement
Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime and
Terrorism, (Apr. 12, 2011) (transcript available at https://archives.fbi.gov
/archives/news/testimony/cybersecurity-responding-to-the-threat-of-cyber-
crime-and-terrorism) (speaking on the current state of cybercrime, the costs
associated with such crime, and the difficulty in combating cybercrime).
16. See GILFORD, supra note 2, at § 16:1 ([B]usiness interruption,
inability to perform obligations to others, and loss or distortion of company
and client data.).
17. PWC, supra note 5, at 4.
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financial institutions.18 More recently, boards of directors have
also been subject to derivative lawsuits filed by their
shareholders for damages caused by cyber breaches.19 This
notion is evidenced by the derivative suits filed against the
boards at Sony, Wyndham Worldwide, and Target by their
shareholders.20
The first part of this article will discuss the current state of
corporate cybersecurity risks and cyber-liability insurance
coverage. Part II will explore the policies behind compulsory
insurance and explain why those policies apply to cybersecurity
risks. Part III will address counter-arguments against a
compulsory cyber-liability insurance regime. Part IV will
explore necessary components in mandatory coverage and the
obstacles in implementation.
I. CURRENT CYBERSECURITY RISKS & AVAILABLE
COVERAGE
A. CURRENT STATE OF CYBERSECURITY RISKS
Companies have cybersecurity risks because of various
vulnerabilities and the multitude of cyber threats.21
Vulnerabilities act like an unlocked door . . . but not a threat if
no one wants to enter.22 However, a single vulnerability may
lead to multiple threats from outside actors who wish to harm
companies by exploiting other vulnerabilities.23
Cyber risks are unique from other security risks due to
the speed with which the threats are evolving and
proliferating,24 and from the ease at which an adversary can
18. GILFORD, supra note 2, at § 16:1.
19. Palkon v. Holmes, No. 2:14CV01234 (SRC), 2014 WL 5341880, at
*26 (D. N.J. Oct. 20, 2014); In re Sony Gaming Networks and Consumer Data
Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 966 (S.D. Cal. 2014); Complaint,
F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Co., No. 2:12-cv-01365-SPL, 2012 WL
12372027, at ¶43 (D. N.J. Aug. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Wyndham Worldwide
Complaint].
20. Palkon, 2014 WL 5341880; In re Sony Gaming Networks., 996 F.
Supp. 2d, at 966; Wyndham Worldwide Complaint, supra note 19, at ¶43.
21. P.W. SINGER & ALLAN FRIEDMAN, CYBER SECURITY AND CYBER WAR:
WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 37 (2014).
22. Id. at 37.
23. Id. at 38; see also 2016 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT,
VERIZON (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2015/.
24. PWC, supra note 5, at 4.
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pick and choose which vulnerability to exploit for any given
goal.25 In order to obtain sensitive, personal information,
cybercriminals constantly probe vulnerabilities and adapt their
tactics to new security measures.26 An example of
cybercriminals evolving their tactics is in the area of social
engineering,27 where hackers evolved phishing into spear
phishing.28 A successful spear phishing attempt will give the
hacker an employees login information, which will grant the
hacker root access.29
Another evolving cyber threat that is difficult to defend
against is automated malicious software called malware.30
Some emails contain attachments that release malware once
opened.31 These malicious codes are programmed to
autonomously search for stored credit card information to send
back to their master.32 Malware is one of the fastest evolving
forms of cyber threats.33 In 2010, McAfee34 discovered a new
specimen of malware every fifteen minutes.35 By 2013, that
rate increased to a new specimen every second.36 The banking
and financial industries are most at risk from malware
25. SINGER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 38.
26. PWC, supra note 5, at 7.
27. Social engineering is defined as a confidence trick. A hacker
pretends to be technical support staff in order to trick employees into
disclosing network access information. See id. at 40.
28. Phishing is a method where a seemingly legitimate email from the
employees company asks the target employee to login on a false but seemingly
official company website. See id. at 41. Spear phishing personalizes the
email message with information that specifically pertains to the target
employee. See id.
29. Root access is defined as the ability to execute any command leaving
the victim completely vulnerable. See id. at 40.
30. See id. at 38.
31. See Malicious Email Attachments, MAKEITSECURE.ORG, http://www
.makeitsecure.org/en/malicious-email-attachments.html (last visited Sept. 9,
2016) (explaining what malicious emails are, how to recognize them, and how
to avoid them).
32. SINGER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 38.
33. Id. at 60.
34. McAfee is a cybersecurity firm and common anti-virus provider. See
About Intel Security, MCAFEE, http://www.mcafee.com/us/index.html (last
visited Sept. 21, 2016) (click through the tab at the bottom of the websites
page to read explanations of what their security products provide and protect
against).
35. SINGER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 60.
36. Id.
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threats.37 In the second quarter of 2015 alone, banking
malware increased from 71% to 83% in a single quarter.38
An example of evolving malware is ransomware,39 which
evolved into crypto-ransomware.40 Crypto-ransomware has
been utilized against hospital systems because the inability to
access patient information creates a sense of urgency to quickly
pay the ransom.41 However, even after a hospital pays the
ransom to regain information access, the hackers may elect to
maintain control or attack again.42
Another sophisticated method of cyber-attack is the
waterhole attack.43 In 2015, hackers attacked United States
defense contractors and financial institutions by compromising
the Forbes.com Thought of the Day (ToTD) Adobe Flash
widget . . . that appears initially whenever anyone visits any
37. See Emm et al., supra note 14, at 21.
38. Id.
39. Ransomware is malware that prevents or limits users from accessing
their system, either by locking the systems screen or by locking the users
[access to] files. Definition: Ransomware, TRENDMICRO, http://www
.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/definition/ransomware (last visited Sept. 9,
2016).
40. Crypto-ransomware encrypt[s] certain file types on infected systems
and forces users to pay the ransom through certain online payment methods
to get a decrypt key. Id.
41. See Kim Zetter, Why Hospitals are the Perfect Targets for
Ransomware, WIRED (Mar. 30, 2016, 1:31 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016
/03/ransomware-why-hospitals-are-the-perfect-targets/ (quoting Stu
Sjouwerman, CEO of the security firm KnowBe4, stating, If you have
patients, you are going to panic way quicker if you are selling sheet metal.).
42. In February 2016, Kansas Heart Hospital paid a $17,000 ransom to
regain access to patient information after being attacked by crypto-
ransomware. The hackers only released some of the locked information and
demanded more money. See Bill Siwicki, Ransomware Attackers Collect
Ransom from Kansas Hospital, Dont Unlock All the Data, Then Demand More
Money, HEALTHCAREITNEWS (May 23, 2016, 2:58 PM), http://www
.healthcareitnews.com/news/kansas-hospital-hit-ransomware-pays-then-
attackers-demand-second-ransom.
43. A waterhole attack compromises a legitimate website to target a
company that often visits that website. See Stephen Ward, Cyber Espionage
Campaign Compromises Web Properties to Target US Financial Services and
Defense Companies, Chinese Dissidents  CVE-2015-0071 and CVE-2014-9163,
ISIGHTPARTNERS (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.isightpartners.com/2015
/02/codoso [https://web.archive.org/web/20160410055615/http://www.isightpar
tners.com/2015/02/codoso/]. The moment a target companys employee visits
the compromised website, the hacker will have access through the
vulnerabilities of that website. Id.
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Forbes.com page or article.44 Since Forbes.com is a highly
trafficked website by many different users, it is difficult to
determine how many companies were affected.45
Damages caused by a single breach are comparable to
natural catastrophes.46 The danger is further exacerbated by
the fact that cyber breaches are becoming more frequent.47
Since 2006, 500 to 800 publicly reported data breaches occur
per year.48 With the probability of catastrophic damage being
high and increasing, it is prudent for at-risk companies to have
insurance in order to ensure that the latest cybersecurity
measures are implemented.49
B. COMPANIES AT RISK
Determining which types of information are highly sought
after helps determine which industries and companies are at
risk for cyber-attacks.50 Personally identifiable information
(PII) accounted for 45% of data breach claims, making it the
most frequently exposed kind of data in 2015.51 The next two
most exposed information types were payment card industry
information (PCI) and protected health information (PHI),
which comprised 27% and 14% of data breach claims,
respectively.52
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. PWC, THE PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF CYBER INSURANCE 3 (Jan.
2016), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/insurance/publications/assets/pwc-insurance-
top-issues-cyber-insurance.pdf (explaining that the extent of damage that can
be caused by a cyber-attack is similar in magnitude to a natural disaster, but
the frequency at which cyber-attacks happen compared with natural disasters
may put limits on what insurers could cover such crime and resulting
damage).
47. Id.
48. WELLS ET AL., supra note 12.
49. See Amit Jain et al., Using Insurance to Mitigate Cybercrime Risk,
CAPGEMINI 3 (2012), https://www.nl.capgemini.com/resource-file-access
/resource/pdf/Using_Insurance_to_Mitigate_Cybercrime_Risk.pdf (arguing
that cybersecurity measures alone are insufficient to mitigate all
vulnerabilities, and that a cybersecurity/cyber-insurance regime is necessary
to protect businesses and other institutions).
50. Id. at 46 (explaining the different forms of cyber-attacks and the
losses suffered across different industries).
51. NETDILIGENCE, supra note 4, at 3.
52. See id.
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These three kinds of sensitive, private information are
stored by companies in different economic sectors, placing those
companies at risk for cyber breaches.53 According to
NetDiligence, the most affected industries were the healthcare,
retail, and financial services industries.54
The healthcare sector was the most frequently breached,
and also had the second largest single breach behind the retail
sector.55 The financial industry was second to the healthcare
industry in frequency.56 In 2014, financial information was
involved in 35.5% of breaches in the retail industry, almost
doubling the previous year.57 The retail industry has the
distinction of exposing the largest number of identities,
accounting for almost 60% of all identities reported exposed.58
According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, these three
industries make up roughly a third of the United States
economy.59 Institutions such as stores, hospitals, and financial
institutions are at a high risk for data breaches. The amount of
consumers in each of the three industries makes a data breach
publicly and economically catastrophic.60
Despite efforts by some firms in the financial sector to
increase their own cybersecurity, many of those same firms
expose themselves to vulnerabilities by doing business with
other companies that do not maintain effective cybersecurity
53. See id. at 18 (finding that fifteen business sectors comprise about 90%
of all cyber breaches between 2012 and 2015).
54. See id. at 18.
55. See id. at 20 (noting that the largest breach in the retail sector was
the loss of 110,000,000 records, and the largest breach in the health care
sector was an 80,000,000 record loss).
56. See id. at 20.
57. 2015 Internet Security Threat Report, SYMANTEC 83 (Apr. 2015),
https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/21347933
_GA_RPT-internet-security-threat-report-volume-20-2015.pdf.
58. This rate increased from 30% in 2013. Id.
59. The financial, health care, and retail industry composed of 32.9% of
the national GDP in 2014. See Value Added by Industry as a Percentage of
Gross Domestic Product, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS (Feb. 19, 2016), http://
bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm (then follow XLSX hyperlink under
Value Added).
60. Jonathan House, Five Takeaways from New GDP-by-Industry Report,
WALL ST. J.: REAL TIME ECON. (Apr. 25, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com
/economics/2014/04/25/five-takeaways-from-new-gdp-by-industry-report/
(finding that finance remains a cornerstone of economy).
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procedures.61 Breaching a large company collaterally is a trend
that is making small and midsize businesses (SMBs) the
principal targets of cybercriminals.62 In 2014, 60% of all
targeted attacks struck SMBs.63 Furthermore, any industry
that is involved with e-commerce is also at risk for cyber
threats.64
C. LIABILITIES FOR COMPANIES
After a cyber breach, the breached company may suffer
damage from the stolen information.65 These companies may
face consumer lawsuits, FTC and SEC enforcement actions,
and shareholder derivative suitsall of which are likely to
incur costly legal fees and high settlements.66
A large corporation storing PII and PCI is liable for
protecting that private information.67 Improper disclosure of
such information exposes organizations to civil liability to the
victim consumers.68 Some jurisdictions are imposing a duty to
61. Dixie L. Johnson et al., SEC Releases Results of Financial Industry
Examination Sweep Regarding Cybersecurity, KING & SPALDING: CLIENT
ALERT 3 (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/library
/publication/ca020615.pdf.
62. See LUIS A. AGUILAR, COMMR OF U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMMN, THE NEED
FOR GREATER FOCUS ON THE CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGES FACING SMALL
AND MIDSIZE BUSINESSES (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement
/cybersecurity-challenges-for-small-midsize-businesses.html.
63. SYMANTEC, supra note 57, at 6.
64. WELLS ET AL., supra note 12.
65. See GILFORD, supra note 2; see also NETDILIGENCE, supra note 4, at 3.
66. See Palkon v. Holmes, No. 2:14CV01234 (SRC), 2014 WL 5341880,
at *26 (D. N.J. Oct. 20, 2014) (where the board of directors was subjected to a
derivative suit filed by shareholders); Press Release, Jessica Rich, Dir. Fed.
Trade Commn Bureau of Consumer Prot., Wyndham Settles FTC Charges It
Unfairly Placed Consumers Payment Card Information At Risk (Dec. 9, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/12/wyndham-settles-ftc-
charges-it-unfairly-placed-consumers-payment (settlement of FTC charges
relating to the companys security practices [which] unfairly exposed the
payment card information of hundreds of thousands of consumers);
NETDILIGENCE, supra note 4, at 67 (showing distribution of the costs that
affect companies subject to cyber breach).
67. See Scott J. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity
Standard of Care?: Exploring the Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity
Framework on Shaping Reasonable National and International Cybersecurity
Practices, 50 TEX. INTL L.J. 305, 316 (2015).
68. Gordon, supra note 10, at 25.
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employ reasonable data security measures under the fiduciary
duty of care.69
1. Class Action: An Example
Consumers filed a class action lawsuit against Target
Corporation in response to a 2013 data breach.70 Hackers had
obtained the financial information of more than forty million
consumers71 from Targets database. Target argued for
dismissal of the ensuing consumer class action for want of
standing because there was no injury in fact.72 For the most
part, the court agreed that most consumers either suffered no
concrete injury or very small losses.73 However, the court
denied Targets motion to dismiss because [s]ome consumers
undoubtedly suffered some injuries.74
On September 17, 2015, Target settled the consumer class
action lawsuit for $10 million.75 Despite this large settlement,
the companys consumer liability is still not completely
resolvedat least four consumers are seeking to opt out of the
class settlement to pursue their own claims.76
Affected consumers are just one of Targets concerns in
relation to the 2013 data breach.77 Financial institutions,
69. California and Massachusetts are the most recent states to impose a
cybersecurity duty on corporate boards. See Shackelford et al., supra note 67,
at 316 (citing In re Sony Gaming Networks and Consumer Data Sec. Breach
Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 966 (S.D. Cal. 2014)).
70. See In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 14-2522,
2015 WL 7253765, at *1 (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 2015) (memorandum & order).
71. See Kelly Clay, Forty Million Target Customers Affected by Data
Breach, FORBES (Dec. 18, 2013, 5:57 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/kellyclay/2013/12/18/millions-of-target-customers-likely-affected-by-data-
breach/#4ba97fa21481 (discussing how around Black Friday, hackers were
able to obtain the data stored on the magnetic strip of credit cards, i.e.;
debit/credit card numbers, card holder names, and the CVV number).
72. In re Target Corp., 2015 WL 7253765, at *1.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. The average payout per claim were estimated to range from $300 to
$2200 per claimant. Id.
76. See generally Court Docket at 1, Gibson v. Target Corp., No. 15-3914
(8th Cir. Dec. 21, 2015); Court Docket at 1, Miorelli v. Target Corp., No.
15-3915 (8th Cir. Dec. 21, 2015); Court Docket at 1, 59, Olson v. Target Corp.,
No. 15-3912 (8th Cir. Dec. 21, 2015); Court Docket at 1, Sciaroni v. Target
Corp., No. 15-3909 (8th Cir. Dec. 21, 2015).
77. See Jonathan Stempel & Anita Bose, Target in $39.4 Million
Settlement with Banks over Data Breach, REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2015, 9:15 PM),
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including MasterCard, filed a separate class action lawsuit
claiming damages for the cost of fraudulent charges and the
replacement of exposed payment cards.78 Target settled with
the financial institutions for $39 million79 and individually
with Visa for $67 million.80 The breach may have cost Target
over $290 million, though the company expects insurers to
cover $90 million.81
Target is just one of many companies subjected to class
action lawsuits over data breaches.82 T-Mobile and Experian
North America Inc. had class action lawsuits filed against them
for allegedly having substandard security practices that
improperly exposed over fifteen million customers private
information.83 The plaintiffs in these suits charged that
it was reasonably foreseeable to defendant that its failure to identify,
implement, maintain and monitor the proper data security
measures, policies, procedures, protocols, and software and
hardware systems to safeguard and protect plaintiffs and class
members consumer credit information would result in a security
lapse, whereby unauthorized third parties would gain access to, and
disseminate, plaintiffs and class members consumer credit
information into the public domain for no permissible purpose under
FCRA.84
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-target-breach-settlement-idUSKBN0TL20Y
20151203.
78. See id.
79. See Ahiza Garcia, Target Settles for $39 Million Over Data Breach,
CNN MONEY (Dec. 2, 2015, 5:48 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/02/news
/companies/target-data-breach-settlement/.
80. Ellen Rosen, SEC Wont Recommend Enforcement Action Over Targets
Data Breach, BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 27, 2015), https://bol.bna.com/sec-wont-
recommend-enforcement-action-over-targets-data-breach/ (The retailer has
reached a settlement with Visa Inc. over the attack and will pay as much as
$67 million to banks that issue Visa cards, a person familiar with the matter
said at the time.).
81. Stempel & Bose, supra note 77 (affirming that the data breach
affected consumers, banks, lenders, and credit unions).
82. Melissa LaFreniere, T-Mobile, Experian Hit with Data Breach Class
Action Lawsuit, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Oct. 6, 2015), http://topclassactions.com
/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/181853-t-mobile-experian-hit-with-data-
breach-class-action-lawsuit/ (discussing how T-Mobile and Experian North
America Inc. are being subject to litigation stemming from hacked T-Mobile
data being stored Experian servers).
83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting the plaintiffs accusations against Experian).
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NetDiligence estimates that the average claim payout
against a large corporation is $4.8 million dollars.85
2. FTC Enforcement Action
In addition to consumer and corporate class action
lawsuits, companies may have to defend against FTC
enforcement actions.86 Any unfair or deceptive acts or
practices . . . affecting commerce are unlawful and subject to
FTC enforcement.87 The FTC deemed the negligent protection
of consumer data to be unfair if it is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers themselves, and it is deceptive if
consumers believe their information is more protected than it
actually is.88 In such a circumstance, the FTC is authorized to
obtain [a]ll remedies available to the Commission . . .
including restitution to domestic or foreign victims under the
FTC Act § 5.89
The FTC used this broad authority against ChoicePoint.90
ChoicePoint is a consumer data broker that had more than
163,000 of its consumers personal financial information
compromised.91 In 2006, the FTC brought a § 5 enforcement
action in response to the data breach and ChoicePoint paid a
$10 million civil penalty in addition to $5 million in consumer
85. See NETDILIGENCE, supra note 4, at 3.
86. See FED. TRADE COMMN, 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE
1 (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-
security-update-2014/privacydatasecurityupdate_2014.pdf ([T]he FTC uses a
variety of tools to protect consumers privacy and persona information. The
FTCs principal tool is to bring enforcement actions to stop law violations and
require companies to take affirmative steps to remediate the unlawful
behavior.); see also Patricia Bailin, Study: What FTC Enforcement Actions Teach
Us About the Features of Reasonable Privacy and Data Security Practices, WESTIN
RES. CTR. 8 (Sept. 19, 2014), https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/FTC-
WhitePaper_V4.pdf (arguing that companies should not be afforded safe harbor
from [FTC] enforcement nor immunity from a privacy or security breach, [given
that] such a program will mitigate risk and strengthen a companys hand in dealing
with any adversity).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
88. Id. § 45(n);Wyndham Worldwide Complaint, supra note 19, at ¶43.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(4)(B).
90. Press Release, Fed. Trade Commn, ChoicePoint Settles Data Security
Breach Charges; to Pay $10 Million in Civil Penalties, $5 Million for Consumer
Redress (Jan. 26, 2006), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2006/01
/choicepoint-settles-data-security-breach-charges-pay-10-million.
91. Id.
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redress in its settlement with the FTC.92 The ChoicePoint data
breach improperly disclosed over eight hundred consumers
private information.93
A more recent FTC enforcement action was brought
against Wyndham Worldwide in 2012.94 Between 2008 and
2009, Wyndhams computer system was hacked on three
separate occasions.95 The FTC alleged that Wyndham deceived
its consumers by representing that it implemented reasonable
and appropriate security measures against unauthorized
access.96 The alleged deception occurred through the privacy
policy Wyndham issued to consumers.97 The FTC argued the
misrepresentation was deceitful because it induced consumers
to entrust their private information to Wyndhams purportedly
updated security system.98
The Wyndham data breach led to more than $10.6 million
in fraud loss, and [the] export of hundreds of thousands of
consumers payment card account information to a domain
registered in Russia.99 On December 9, 2015, Wyndham
settled with the FTC.100 Although the settlement did not
require Wyndham to pay any penalties, the terms of the
agreement were costly for the company.101 The settlement
agreement requires Wyndhams security system to conform to
the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard for
certification and to obtain annual audits for certification
compliance.102 Additionally, Wyndham must provide the FTC
with an assessment if another data breach that affects more
than ten thousand payment card numbers occurs.103 Wyndham
is subject to these and other monitoring and reporting
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. E.g., F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Co., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
95. See id. at 236.
96. Wyndham Worldwide Complaint, supra note 19, at ¶44.
97. See id. at ¶21.
98. See id. at ¶48.
99. Id. at ¶2.
100. See, e.g., Stipulated Order for Injunction, F.T.C. v. Wyndham
Worldwide Co., No. 2:13-CV-01887-ES-JAD (D. N.J. Dec. 11, 2015)
[hereinafter Wyndham Worldwide Stipulated Order]; see also Rich, supra note
66.
101. Rich, supra note 66.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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requirements for at least the next twenty years.104 Abiding by
the heightened security standards only prevents FTC
enforcement action in the event of another breach.105 Civil class
actions from consumers and financial institutions may still be
filed.106
3. SEC Enforcement Action
The FTC is not the only federal agency with the authority
to bring government actions in the event of a data breach.107
The SEC may also bring enforcement actions under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.108 The SEC issues penalties
and orders when a breached company discloses inaccurate or
misleading information to investors after a data breach,109 or if
the breach involves investment advisers.110
The Securities Exchange Act Section 10b and SEC Rule
10b-5 require companies to disclose any material fact about the
company to investors.111 A fact is material if its
misrepresentation or its omission convinces the investor to
trade shares of the company.112 The fraud-on-the-market
theory stipulates that the market price of shares traded on
well-developed markets reflects all publicly available
104. Wyndham Worldwide Stipulated Order, supra note 100, at 4, 13.
105. Rich, supra note 66 ([I]f Wyndham successfully obtains the necessary
compliance certifications, it will be deemed in compliance with the
comprehensive information security program provision of the order.).
Wyndham is just one of fifty-three corporations the FTC has settled with
concerning data security. Rosen, supra note 80 (According to the FTC, the
agency has already settled 53 data-security cases against companies including
SnapChat Inc., Reed Elsevier Inc. and Credit Karma Inc.).
106. Rich, supra note 66.
107. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2012).
108. Id.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016); Rosen, supra
note 80 (The SEC has the authority to impose penalties on companies that
dont disclose the magnitude of data breaches or fail to properly detail their
policies and procedures in protecting consumer data.).
110. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2012); 17
C.F.R. § 248.30 (2016).
111. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2012)
(requiring that a security be registered if it is to be traded on a national
security exchange); 17 C.F.R. § 230.120 (2016) (requiring that registration
statements be made public).
112. Basic, Inc., v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 983 (1988).
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information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations.113
The SEC cautions that data breaches may require disclosure.114
The investment advisory firm R.T. Jones Capital Equities
Inc. suffered a data breach in July 2013 which allowed an
unauthorized, unknown intruder access to the PII of more than
100,000 individuals.115 As a result, the SEC brought an action
against R.T. Jones for violating the Safeguards Rule.116 The
SEC alleged that R.T. Jones failed to properly implement
measures that reasonably protected the private information of
its clients.117 R.T. Jones and the SEC settled the matter.118 R.T.
Jones agreed to implement better safeguards of PII, preventing
another incident in addition to paying a $75,000 penalty to the
SEC.119 Although the penalty was small in amount, the legal
fees incurred may have been substantial.120
The R.T. Jones proceeding is just one instance of the SEC
closely scrutinizing data breaches.121 As cybersecurity risks
threaten more and more corporations, the SEC is expanding its
focus on data security.122 SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar
placed a board of directors on notice for cybersecurity liability
when he said [b]oards of directors are already responsible for
overseeing the management of all types of risk, including credit
risk, liquidity risk, and operational risk  and there can be
little doubt that cyber-risk also must be considered as part of a
113. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408
(2014) (quoting Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 991 (1988)).
114. See SEC. EXCH. COMMN., CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: TOPIC NO. 2
(Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-
topic2.htm (Although no existing disclosure requirement explicitly refers to
cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents, a number of disclosure requirements
may impose an obligation on registrants to disclose such risks and incidents.).
115. R.T. Jones Capital Equities Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 4204, 2015 WL 5560846, at *2 (Sept. 22, 2015).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at *1.
119. Id. at *4.
120. See NETDILIGENCE, supra note 4, at 3 ([T]he average cost for legal
defense was $434,354.).
121. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Exchange Act Release
No. 78021, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4415, 2016 WL 3181325
(June 8, 2016); Marc A. Ellis, Exchange Act Release No. 64220, 2011 WL
1325566 (Apr. 7, 2011); LPL Fin. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 58515,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2775, 2008 WL 4179915 (Sept. 11, 2008).
122. See AGUILAR, supra note 62.
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boards overall risk oversight.123 The SEC even suggested that
SMBs should have a greater focus on cybersecurity risks.124
4. Shareholder Derivative Lawsuits
In addition to class action lawsuits, FTC enforcement
actions, and SEC enforcement actions, boards of directors may
be subject to derivative lawsuits filed by the companys
shareholders.125 Derivative lawsuits over cybersecurity
breaches usually allege that the board of directors breached its
fiduciary duty of care.126
The Wyndham Worldwide data breach resulted in such a
derivative suit.127 In Palkon v. Holmes, shareholder Dennis
Palkon sued Wyndhams board of directors for refusing his
demand to bring a lawsuit against the board itself on the
companys behalf.128 The court ruled that the decision to bring
a suit on behalf of the company is reviewed under the business
judgment rule.129 Under the business judgment rule, courts
presume that boards of directors make their decision on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company.130 The
court dismissed the suit because the plaintiff could not rebut
the strong presumption that the decision was made in good
faith.131
The problems facing corporate boards of directors do not
end after dismissal of a derivative suit.132 A proxy firm
addressing the Target data breach called for the ouster of most
123. Luis A. Aguilar, Commr of U.S. Sec. Exch. Commn, Boards of
Directors, Corporate Governance and Cyber-Risks: Sharpening the Focus,
Conference Speech at the New York Stock Exchange (June 10, 2014)
(transcript available on the SEC website at https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech
/Detail/Speech/1370542057946).
124. See AGUILAR, supra note 62.
125. See, e.g., Palkon v. Holmes, No. 2:14CV01234 (SRC), 2014 WL
5341880 (D. N.J. Oct. 20, 2014).
126. See, e.g., id. at *2 (At the heart of Plaintiffs Complaint is an
assertion that Defendants failed to implement adequate data-security
mechanisms.).
127. See id. at *12.
128. Id. at *2.
129. Id. at *3.
130. Id. at *3 (quoting Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 774 (Del. 1990)).
131. Id. at *67.
132. Aguilar, supra note 123.
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of the Target directors for failure to appropriately manage the
risks.133 The SEC said that Targets December 2013 cyber-
attack is another driver that should put directors on notice to
proactively address the risks associated with cyber-attacks,
which suggests the possibility that boards of directors will have
the duty to manage cybersecurity risks incorporated into their
fiduciary duty of care.134 Although Targets board ultimately
remained unchanged, Targets CEO was ousted as a result of
the data breach.135
In analyzing cyber risks, corporations often overlook, or
underestimate legal fees. The defense cost after a data breach
was $434,354.136 Even after paying damages, penalties, and
legal fees, there is still the cost of required monitoring and
reporting from FTC settlementssome of which last for twenty
years.137 Such damages and costs may put a company out of
business.138 Businesses may need an insurance policy to cover
these expenses to remain solvent and to ensure best
safeguarding practices.139
D. CURRENT AVAILABLE COVERAGE
Currently, the insurance market views cyber risk as a risk
like no other because of limited publicly available data and the
quick evolution and proliferation of threats.140 Quick growth in
threats is why annual gross written premiums are expected to
increase from $2.5 billion to $7.5 billion by the end of the
decade.141
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Matt Townsend et al., Target CEO Ouster Shows New Board Focus on
Cyber Attacks, BLOOMBERG (May 6, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2014-05-05/target-ceo-ouster-shows-new-board-focus-on-cyber-
attacks.
136. NETDILIGENCE, supra note 4, at 3.
137. Wyndham Worldwide Stipulated Order, supra note 100, at 4, 13.
138. Gordon, supra note 10, at 25.
139. See Brian Krebs, The Case for Cybersecurity Insurance, Part I, KREBS
ON SEC. (June 22, 2010), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2010/06/the-case-for-
cybersecurity-insurance-part-i/ (discussing a company that had cybersecurity
insurance and was the victim of cybercrime).
140. PWC, supra note 5, at 4, 7.
141. See id. at 4.
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Even with the likely increase in premiums, the coverage
available may not be adequate.142 Insurance products and the
applicable law have not been keeping pace with the emergent
ubiquity of information technology in commercial
enterprises.143 An example of how insurance policies and laws
fail to keep up with cyber risks is the way courts are
interpreting the scope of coverage in common commercial
general liability policies (CGL).144 Most companies depended on
CGL policies to cover liabilities and losses involved in data
breaches, but courts have found no coverage.145 State courts are
split on whether Property Damage coverage encompasses loss
or corruption of electronic data because there is a dispute on
the definition of tangible property.146
One case that ruled on the tangible property issue is
Ward General Insurance Services, Inc. v. Employers Fire
Insurance Co.147 In that case, Ward Generals systems crashed
and the company lost the electronically stored data it used to
service its clients insurance policies.148 Ward General lost
$53,586.83 in expenses to restore its database in addition to
$209,442.80 in business income, losses of productivity,
commissions, and profits.149 The defendant insurance company
refused to cover the damages due to the policy explicitly
covering only a direct physical loss to property covered.150
The court ruled in favor of the insurance company because
Ward General did not suffer a direct physical loss.151 In data
breaches, the property lost is the data; courts have defined data
as factual or numerical information.152 Loss of a database is
the loss of organized information, and courts reject the notion
142. WELLS ET AL., supra note 12.
143. Id.
144. See Daniel Garrie & Michael Mann, Cyber-Security Insurance:
Navigating the Landscape of a Growing Field, 31 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER
& INFO. L. 379, 38384 (2014) (describing a courts ruling that a commercial
general liability policy did not cover cyber-attacks).
145. Cf. id. at 385 (stating that many businesses consider cybersecurity
insurance to be too costly).
146. WELLS ET AL., supra note 12, § 29.02[1].
147. 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2003).
148. Id. at 846.
149. Id. (alteration in original).
150. Id. at 848.
151. Id. at 849.
152. Id. at 850.
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that information can have a material existence, be formed of
tangible matter, or be perceptible to touch.153 Loss of the
physical data storage medium, such as paper or hard drive,
may be covered as a direct physical loss, but the value of the
information stored is not deemed a loss because information is
intangible.154
Courts have ruled similarly to Ward General Insurance in
its view that data and information are not tangible and thus
are not covered.155 Courts have applied this ruling to third-
party coverage insurance policies.156 In America Online, Inc. v.
St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co., the Fourth Circuit ruled that
the commercial general liability coverage does not cover
information because data are abstract ideas, logic,
instructions, and information.157
Due to the high potential for damages arising out of a data
breach and the courts unwillingness to extend general liability
coverage to electronic information, it is important for a
company to purchase an insurance policy that specifically
covers cyber-liability.158 The current coverage available may
not be ideal for companies since most policies are Named-
Peril policies.159 Currently, first-party coverages may include
losses resulting from responding to a data breach . . . [,] loss of
electronic data, software, hardware, and costs of reconstructing
data[,] loss of use and business interruption[,] data security
and privacy injury[,] . . . business interruptions due to improper
access to computer systems[, and] public relation for cyber
153. Id. at 851.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Midwest Computs. &
More, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 111516 (W.D. Okla. 2001) ([C]omputer data
cannot be touched, held, or sensed by the human mind; it has no physical
substance. It is not tangible property.).
156. Am. Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 89 (4th Cir.
2003).
157. Id. at 96.
158. See GILFORD, supra note 2, at 16-5 (noting that recent CGL and
property insurance policies attempt to explicitly exclude coverage for cyber
risks).
159. Named-Peril policies cover only specified perils or risks. Id. § 16:3.1
at 16-29 to 16-30. This format may result in restrictive exclusions and
conditionssuch as state-of-the-art data encryption or 100% updated security
patch clauseswhich are difficult for any business to maintain. PWC, supra
note 46, at 2.
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risks.160 Insurers are constantly changing and reevaluating
their cyber-liability policies in response to evolving cyber
risks.161 Risk managers seeking cyber-liability coverage should
evaluate their needs and risks relative to a detailed evaluation
of the offered coverage.162
Frequent policy reformation negatively impacts those who
seek to purchase policies.163 An issue that arises is determining
the overlap between cyber-liability policies and traditional
policies.164 The traditional policy provider may not be the same
provider for the cyber-liability policy.165 An overlap in coverage
would mean that the policy holder would pay for the same
coverage twice and it would prolong the claims process with
two carriers arguing with each other as to which is
responsible, or about how to allocate responsibility between
them for a particular loss.166
The changing definition of what a claim is can be
important to the policy holder as well.167 The definition
establishes the formalities required for coverage availability for
a particular regulatory initiative.168 How a claim is defined
determines whether the holder is covered during government
enforcement actions, either by the FTC or SEC.169 For example,
certain policies may require the filing of a notice of charges, an
investigative order, or similar document, which means that
formal administrative actions may be a precondition to
coverage.170 However, policy holders often prefer that
administrative proceedings remain informal, and often times
they are.171 Furthermore, most policies exclude coverage for
160. GILFORD, supra note 2, at § 16:3.1.
161. Id. § 16:3, at 16-28.
162. Id.
163. Cf. id. ([I]t is likely that gaps in coverage for cyber and privacy risks
will continue to widen as insurers increase the number of exclusions.).
164. Id. § 16:3.2.C, at 16-34.
165. Cf. id. (referring to two carriers in the context of overlapping
insurance policies).
166. Id.
167. See id. § 16:3.2, at 16-37 to 16-38.
168. Id. at 16-36 to 16-37.
169. Office Depot, Inc. v. Natl Union Fire Ins. Co., 453 F. Appx 871, 875
(11th Cir. 2011).
170. GILFORD, supra note 2, § 16:3.2.F, at 16-38 to 16-39.
171. Id.
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fines, penalties, and violations of law as a matter of public
policy.172
These non-explicit exclusions cause problems when policy
holders try to claim coverage from their insurers.173 Companies
may pay a high premium for little or no benefit. The current
gross written premium for cyber risk is around $2.5 billion.174
Companies using outdated security protocols risk damages
caused by data breaches, including not receiving coverage after
paying high premiums, negative impact of financial stability,
and harm to consumers.175
II. POLICIES FOR COMPULSORY INSURANCE
A. OUTSOURCING REGULATORY DUTIES
Compulsory insurance benefits the public by outsourcing
the role of regulator to insurance companies.176 Outsourcing
the regulatory role is best done in areas that are difficult for
the government to regulate either due to logistical difficulties
or political climate.177 For example, a recent push to outsource
the governments role as regulator is in gun control.178 The
push behind mandatory firearm liability insurance arose from
the fact that stringent gun control while the norm elsewhere
seems politically impossible here.179
Some state legislators proposed mandatory firearm
liability insurance to manage gun violence and to cause gun
owners, rather than taxpayers, to bear the costs of firearm
172. Id. § 16:3.2.G, at 16-41 to 16-44.
173. E.g., Office Depot, Inc., 453 F. Appx at 871; MBIA, Inc. v. Fed. Ins.
Co., 652 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2011).
174. PWC, supra note 5, at 4, 7.
175. See PWC, supra note 46, at 2 (mentioning insurers high prices and
strict limits on coverage).
176. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How
Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 20003 (2012)
(describing how private insurers reduce risk by modifying insureds behavior).
177. See Tom Harvey, The Case for Compulsory Gun Insurance,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 2, 2013, 6:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/tom-harvey/the-case-for-compulsory-g_b_4029894.html (describing how
compulsory gun insurance could avoid the political difficulty of other methods
of gun regulation).
178. See, e.g., id.
179. Id.
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accidents.180 Compulsory insurance is a private means to
regulate a problem without focusing on the cause.181
Mandatory insurance would be a method to impose firearm
regulations and controls without the governments
involvement.182
Insurance companies set compliance requirements as part
of their insurance policies.183 These requirements sometimes
are more stringent than government regulations184 and help
decrease risk by increasing levels of care.185 Insurance
companies adjust premiums based on whether the policy holder
implements safety conditions to create a monetary incentive to
comply with the stricter standards.186 Insurance companies
regulate an industry by using the private marketplace to
reduce the negativeand if possible, increase the positive
externalities associated with that activity.187 Essentially,
insurers directly influence the behavior of those they insure.188
Insurers have a monetary incentive to ensure compliance
with the requirements of the policy.189 This monetary incentive
makes insurers adept at collecting data on the insured activity
and the risks associated with the activity.190 Legislators hope
that subjecting insurers to claims will incentivize them to study
gun violence to develop methods to reduce its frequency and
severity for the policy holders to follow.191 Teaching the insured
best prevention methods is something that public regulators
rarely do.192 Unlike government regulators, insurance
companies often offer their policyholders training to identify
180. George A. Mocsary, Insuring Against Guns?, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1209,
1217 (2014).
181. Harvey, supra note 177.
182. Id.
183. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 176, at 211.
184. Id.
185. Steven Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements and Compulsory
Liability Insurance as Solutions to the Judgment-Proof Problem, 36 RAND J.
ECON. 63, 65 (2005).
186. Rob Hillenbrand, Heller on the Threshold: Crafting a Gun Insurance
Mandate, 95 B.U. L .REV. 1451, 1459 (2015).
187. Mocsary, supra note 180, at 1230.
188. See id.
189. Id. at 123435.
190. Id. at 1231.
191. Id. at 1234.
192. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 176, at 210.
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and control risks.193 Insurers involvement in their carriers loss
prevention program goes even further than just education.194 It
is not uncommon for insurers to audit and inspect their
clients, manage their prevention efforts, analyze their loss
history, identify causes of accidents and how losses occur, and
teach them how to avoid premium increases (or how to secure
premium reductions).195
Another instance of insurers acting as regulators is in the
workplace.196 Most employers are required to purchase
workers compensation insurance for work-related harms to
their employees.197 Insurers significantly engage in either ex
ante underwriting or ex post experience rating, or both to
accurately price their policies.198 This results in regular visits
from insurance representatives seeking to monitor employer
compliance with both government and insurer codes and
recommendations.199
B. ENSURING VICTIMS AREMADEWHOLE
Compulsory insurance and optional insurance serve
different purposes in terms of protection.200 Where optional
insurance protects the policy holder, compulsory insurance
seeks to protect potential victims of the policy holder.201 An
example is automobile insurance, which is compulsory in
nearly all states.202 The justifications for having compulsory
automobile insurance shed light on why cyber-liability
insurance should follow that same route.
The New York state legislature implemented a compulsory
regime for automobile insurance in response to its concern
over the rising toll of motor vehicle accidents and the suffering
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 23637.
197. Id. at 237.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 6 CHRISTOPHER J. ROBINETTE, NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW &
PRACTICE § 61.02, at 61-17 (2015).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 61-16.
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and loss thereby inflicted.203 It became a matter of grave
concern that motorists shall be financially able to respond in
damages for their negligent acts, so that innocent victims of
motor vehicle accidents may be recompensed for the injury and
financial loss inflicted upon them.204
A potential benefit of having a compulsory regime concerns
the issue of whether certain exclusions or limitations apply.205
When a dispute arises about whether an exclusion or limitation
is valid, courts typically examine the public policy and purpose
of the statute to determine the validity of an exclusion.206
Courts will uphold an exclusion or limitation unless those
terms are against public policy.207 Courts have ruled that
statutes express public policy and insurers may not circumvent
a statute with a written restriction or exclusion.208
Because the public policy underlying compulsory insurance
is victim protection, courts may rule more favorably towards
providing coverage in an incident despite what is written in the
insurance policy.209 This will give consumer victims more
security in being made whole. 210
C. THE NEED FOR COMPULSORY CYBER-LIABILITY COVERAGE
1. Insurers Would Be Better Regulators
Compulsory cyber-liability insurance is needed for at-risk
companies because government regulators are not properly
staffed to oversee the affected industries.211 Due to the speed
203. Motor Vehicle Financial Security Act, N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 310
(McKinney 2015).
204. Id.
205. See Mocsary, supra note 180, at 1218 (mentioning a Connecticut law
which would have forbidden certain exclusions from compulsory insurance
policies).
206. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 757 N.E.2d 881, 883 (Ill.
2001).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., id. (holding void an exclusion in a compulsory auto insurance
policy which violated the public policy embodied in a statute).
210. Harvey, supra note 177 ([R]equired . . . insurance must be
implemented in a way . . . that encourages safe practices [and] compensates
victims.).
211. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 176, at 201 (illustrating the
superior abilities of insurance companies at regulating risks related to data
protection).
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with which the threats are evolving and proliferating,212 the
frequency and impact of data breaches will only increase.213
The FTC only has forty-five members in its Division of Privacy
and Data Protection to regulate the consumer retail
industry.214 The FTCs forty-five member division is responsible
for keeping up with the latest threats and ensuring that
companies are properly secured against those emerging
threats.215 Either the FTC would have to remain within its
limited operative scope, or the taxpayers would have to fund
expansion of the manpower in the Division of Privacy and Data
Protection to adequately address the frequency of data
breaches.216 Insurance companies are better equipped with
more resources to regulate risks that span across multiple
industries, which ultimately eases the burden on taxpayers.217
A comprehensive compulsory regime ultimately seeks to
remove pressure on governments to provide . . . relief.218
Manpower and resources are essential in regulating
corporate cybersecurity because information governance
systems require monitoring.219 Monitoring compliance can be
done ex ante (before harm has occurred) or ex post (after the
harm has occurred).220 Ex ante inspections would be to confirm
the installation of safety devices and inspect the conduct of
212. PWC, supra note 5, at 4.
213. Amy Lee, Citigroup: $2.7 Million Stolen from Customers as Result of
Hacking, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 27, 2011, 10:12 AM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/27/citigroup-hack_n_885045.html (Experts have
suggested that hackers used spyware to capture data from customers as they
logged in, though they were not able to get the CVV codes that accompany the
physical card. With 154 million Americans owning credit cards, the incidence
of such hacks is only expected to rise.).
214. FTC Staff Directory, FED. TRADE COMMN (Sept. 18, 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/contact-federal-trade-
commission/whitepages.pdf.
215. See id. (listing the forty-five members of the FTC Division of Privacy
and Data Protection); see also FED. TRADE COMMN, supra note 86, at 1
(showing the tools available to the FTC to ensure data privacy).
216. See generally Bailin, supra note 86, at 2 (showing that the current
scope of FTC involvement in data privacy cases has been limited to only forty-
seven citations since 2002).
217. Mocsary, supra note 180, at 1231.
218. Michael Faure & Veronique Bruggeman, Catastrophic Risks and
First-Party Insurance, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 41 (2008).
219. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 176, at 236.
220. Id.
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regulated parties.221 Ex post monitoring would be done to
determine liability or coverage after an occurrence.222 Insurers
will likely inspect risk-management techniques along with the
disaster response plan.223 Most importantly, insurers will be
inspecting how employees and third-parties access the data
systems.224 Companies will have their areas of risks scrutinized
and their vulnerabilities addressed.225 These types of
monitoring and regulatory inspections are often done more
effectively by insurers that develop regulatory practices and
technologies that the government lacks.226
Compulsory insurance is needed for cyber-liability because
of the lack of information available to companies.227 Some
companies are unaware of their own vulnerabilities and the
threats to their data security.228 In such a climate, compulsory
insurance may mitigate the problems of asymmetric
information and adverse selection.229 When there is an
imminent threat on which few companies have adequate
information, a regulation would be an efficient method to cure
the information deficiency230 by introducing a general duty to
insure.231
Similar to firearm liability insurance, compulsory cyber-
liability insurance aims to have insurance companies provide
and enforce best practices.232 Insurers will directly influence
corporate behavior once they reduce the negativeand if
221. Id.
222. Id. at 23637.
223. Cyber Liabilities Policy, NAIC (last updated Jan. 04, 2016),
http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_cyber_risk.htm.
224. Id.
225. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 176, at 203 (illustrating how risk
assessment of companies allows insurance companies to spread their own risk
out to minimize losses).
226. Id. at 236.
227. See Faure & Bruggeman, supra note 218, at 3435 (explaining that
companies may be a high risk for liability for a cyber-attack without knowing
it).
228. Id. at 34.
229. Id. at 3435.
230. See id. (showing that information problems occur when the potential
victim cannot accurately assess the catastrophic risk he is exposed to or the
benefits of the purchase of first-party insurance).
231. Id. at 35.
232. See Mocsary, supra note 180, at 1212 (proposing that mandatory
insurance on firearm owners may be used as a form of private regulation).
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possible, increase the positiveexternalities in managing
cyber risks.233 Giving insurance companies a monetary
incentive in corporate cybersecurity ensures that insurers
research risk minimizing practices and educate their
insured.234 The narrow policy terms and conditions235 in cyber-
insurance policies could incentivize organizations to focus more
on their actual security rather than simply checking
compliance checkboxes.236 These practices would likely be
required as part of their policy and compliance would be
ensured through monitoring.237 These measures will help
increase levels of care in at-risk corporations more than what
government regulators would provide.238 The Deputy Treasury
Secretary stated that [q]ualifying for cyber-risk insurance can
provide useful information for assessing [a] banks risk level
and identifying cybersecurity tools and best practices that [it]
may be lacking.239 Increasing compliance to higher standards
may be a reason why some experts believe that theres little
doubt that cyber-insurance will be a requirement that
the FFIEC[240] includes in its forthcoming cyber guidance for
banks.241
2. Insurance Ensures Victim Compensation
Similar to automobile risks, cyber-insurance has the
potential to protect not just the breached company, but also
millions of consumers.242 Cyber risks have high potential
233. Id. at 1230.
234. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 176, at 210.
235. PWC, supra note 5, at 10.
236. Both Target and Neiman Marcus claim to have met PCI DSS
requirements. Mark Campbell, Mandatory Cyber Insurance  Driving
Improved Security or Just Passing the Buck?, CIPHERCLOUD (Mar. 17, 2014),
http://www.ciphercloud.com/blog/mandatory-cyber-insurance-driving-
improved-security-just-passing-buck/.
237. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 176, at 236.
238. Shavell, supra note 185, at 65.
239. Tracy Kitten, Will Banks Be Required to Have Cyber-Insurance,
BANKINFO SEC. (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/cyber-
insurance-expectations-for-banks-a-7673/op-1.
240. About the FFIEC, FED. FIN. INSTITS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL,
https://www.ffiec.gov/about.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
241. Kitten, supra note 239.
242. Gordon, supra note 10, at 26 (explaining that financial institutions are
required to have a security plan in place to protect consumers information).
416 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 18:1
damages that may put a company out of business.243 Cyber risk
insurance helps companies remain solvent when making
victims whole.244 Companies with cybersecurity insurance were
likely to recover their direct financial losses despite suffering
substantial thefts.245 In the case of Brookeland Fresh Water
Supply District, cybersecurity insurance protected 1300 homes
and businesses from not receiving water.246
Although large corporations are able to compensate
consumers, SMBs247 do not have the resources to do so.248 The
compulsory insurance regime would cover both large
corporations and the smaller contractors they share data
with.249 This incentivizes large corporations to ensure that
their contractors are properly equipped with the best practices
at minimizing cyber risk as well.250 If an SMB is breached for
the data it receives from large corporations, the victims would
be compensated.251
III. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS
A. THE ARBITRARY LINE
One problem with implementing a compulsory cyber-
liability regime is that costly premiums will create an arbitrary
line between affected large corporations and the exempted
SMBs.252 Although SMBs are more at risk than large
243. Id. at 25.
244. See Krebs, supra note 139, at 1 (showing how one company managed
to remain solvent and recoup their losses through their cybersecurity
insurance policy).
245. Id.
246. Brian Krebs, The Case for Cybersecurity Insurance, Part II, KREBS ON
SEC. (July 14, 2010), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2010/07/the-case-for-
cybersecurity-insurance-part-ii/.
247. Small and Medium Businesses.
248. AGUILAR, supra note 62.
249. See id. (explaining how cyber-attacks against SMBs may be used to
gain access to larger corporations they do business with).
250. Id.
251. E.g., Krebs, supra note 139 (showing how a medium sized business
recovered all of their losses from a cyber-attack through their cybersecurity
insurance policy by paying only their ten-thousand dollar deductible).
252. See id. (explaining how a medium sized business owner feared that
after being targeted by a cyber-attack her insurance policy premiums would
rise beyond her ability to pay them).
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corporations due to their inadequate resources against cyber
threats, the premiums for coverage are unaffordable.253
At first, the compulsory regime would require that large
corporations not only cover their own liabilities, but also the
liabilities of the companies they contract with. As will be
further discussed in Part IV, hackers breached Target through
a medium-sized company it contracted with, showing how
working with insecure companies affects large corporations.254
Hopefully, this will give large corporations the incentive to help
medium-sized contractors improve their cybersecurity by
providing training and the necessary resources to implement
the adequate security measures.255
One of the main concerns in closely scrutinizing the
security measures of smaller companies is that compliance
costs might run them out of business.256 This scenario can be
avoided by giving SMBs a temporary tax incentive for focusing
on data security.257 This tax incentive will be available to SMBs
while large corporations are compelled to purchase policies,
which will, in time, drastically reduce the premiums to a level
where the medium- and small-sized businesses can afford to
participate.258
An aspect of cyber-insurance that would benefit from a
compulsory regime is that the policies would become more
sustainable for the underwriters and the companies being
insured.259 Requiring cyber risk insurance may reduce the
premiums.260 A reason for high premiums may be the limited
number of participating insurers.261 Mandating cyber-
253. AGUILAR, supra note 62 (stating that the majority of all cyber-attacks
target small and medium sized businesses that do not have the resources
available to prevent them).
254. Id. (describing how the costly cyber-attack against Target resulted
from the breach of a much smaller company that Target conducted business
with).
255. See id. (suggesting that government entities may also be able take
part in educating SMBs on how to improve their cybersecurity).
256. See id. (confirming that generally SMBs lack the resources to fund a
legitimate cyber defense).
257. See id. (suggesting that tax credits may be a viable option to
encourage the development of viable cybersecurity solutions for SMBs).
258. See id.
259. PWC, supra note 5, at 10.
260. Id. (noting that the general cost of cyber-insurance policies are three
times higher than other more common forms of insurance for the same limit).
261. See id.
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insurance would push for research to make the necessary data
more available for the underwriters to use as they develop their
policies.262 Once the premiums are more affordable, the SMBs
will also be compelled to purchase these policies.263
B. SHIFTING COSTS TO CONSUMERS
Another concern of a compulsory cyber-liability regime is
that large corporations will shift the cost to consumers by
increasing their prices. Although this concern is likely to occur
for most companies, some companies may choose to not shift
the cost.264 A company may avoid cost shifting if the company
was a recent victim of a data breach.265 When a company
inadvertently exposes its customers private information, it is
unlikely that it will shift the cost to consumers to protect that
information.266
For companies that do shift costs, having the consumers
assume the cost is better than the alternative of having every
taxpayer fund the expansion of government regulations.267
Much like firearm liability insurance, those who would bear the
costs are those who participate in the activity.268 Therefore,
price shifting is only a concern for those who shop at large
retailers or enlist the services of large banks.269 This may
incentivize shoppers to shop locally at smaller businesses since
those smaller businesses would be exempt from the cyber-
liability insurance requirement. Furthermore, the cost shifting
should be temporary, as premiums can be expected to decrease
262. Id. (Part of the reason for the high prices is . . . the uncertainty
around how much to put aside for potential losses[.]).
263. Cf. id. (requiring policy holders to have state-of-the-art data
encryption or 100% updated security patch clauses has proved to be a heavy
burden on businesses, regardless of size, in obtaining these policies).
264. See Debra L. Shinder, Cyber-Insurance: Is it Necessary? Should it Be
Mandatory?, GFI BLOG (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.gfi.com/blog/cyber-
insurance-is-it-necessary-should-it-be-mandatory/ (stating that loss of
customer trust may effect companies profitability in the event of a data breach
and thus prevent the shifting of costs to customers so as to not further deepen
this loss of trust).
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 176, at 210 (noting that private
insurers often have an advantage over government regulations in this area).
268. See id.
269. But see AGUILAR, supra note 62 (stating that SMBs face the greatest
threat from cyber-attacks).
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after a compulsory regime is implemented.270 Once premiums
are lowered, the remaining increase in price should be
minimal.271
C. MORAL HAZARD
There is an argument that a compulsory insurance regime
would be a detriment to corporate diligence in managing cyber
risk.272 Some fear that insurance might take away some of
the financial incentive to avoid data breaches since the
losses and damages would be covered.273
There are many reasons why such a negative effect is not
likely. The first is that insurance cannot recover consumer
trust.274 Without consumer trust, profitability becomes
difficult.275
Another reason why cyber-liability insurance does not
present a moral hazard is because it actually gives companies
a monetary incentive to be diligent through premium
increases or potential policy cancellation.276 Compulsory
liability coverage may force the policy holders to make
superior decisions about whether to engage in an activity
and . . . have stronger incentives to reduce risk when they have
at stake at least the required level of assets and/or liability
insurance coverage if they are sued for causing harm.277
Experience rating (basing an insureds premiums on prior
claim experience) may incentivize a carrier to reduce the moral
hazard by in turn incentivizing the policy holder to reduce risk
of loss.278 Another method of reducing the moral hazard of
being insured is for the insurer to require strict compliance
with security requirements as a condition for coverage.279
270. PWC, supra note 5, at 10.
271. Id.
272. Shinder, supra note 264.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Shavell, supra note 185, at 63.
278. Mocsary, supra note 180, at 1231.
279. Id. at 1235. One area that is commonly uninsured are losses from
intentional harmful activities. Id.
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There is still a concern that a moral hazard may appear
once the monetary incentive from premiums diminishes.280 A
compulsory cyber-liability regime would decrease the
premiums for those policies over time. Low premiums may be
ineffective in influencing insureds behavior if actuarially-fair
premiums would be low even for high risks because an
increased-but-still-low cost may not alter ones behavior.281
However, consumer trust is still an asset that cannot be
replaced by insurance.282
IV. COMPREHENSIVE COMPULSORY COVERAGE
A. STANDARDS FOR COMPREHENSIVE COMPULSORY COVERAGE
Making cyber-liability insurance mandatory would mean
that certain risks and liabilities must be covered to make the
compliance costs and premium payments beneficial to the
corporation.283 A mandatory policy would need to cover loss
arising from third-party claims, the direct first-party costs of
responding to a breach, loss of income and operating expenses,
and cyber extortion threats against a company.284 Specifically,
the policy should cover damages arising from lawsuits,
government enforcement actions, legal fees, business
interruption, system repair costs, data recovery costs, response
costs, hardware damage, and third-party liability.285
The insurance policies should address the legal obligations
that may arise from a data security breach.286 Legal obligations
may be payments of damages and settlement, civil penalties,
and legal fees.287 Other industry-specific obligations may also
arise, depending on the industry. Generally, breached
companies may be required to retain third-party investigators
to identify the cause of the breach, the perpetrator, and the
280. Id. at 1232.
281. Id.
282. Shinder, supra note 264.
283. Kevin M. LaCroix, Cyber Security, Cyber Governance, and Cyber
Insurance: What Every Public Company Director Needs to Know, D&O DIARY
(June 4, 2014), http://www.dandodiary.com/2014/06/articles/cyber-liability
/guest-post-cyber-security-cyber-governance-and-cyber-insurance-what-every-
public-company-director-needs-to-know/.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
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victims to be notified, and further to remedy flaws in the
security system.288 If the company is in the financial or retail
industry and carries financial information such as payment
card information, the breached company may be required to
provide credit monitoring services, copies of credit reports to
account holders, and compensation to banks for fraudulent
charges.289 Monitoring and reporting requirements arising out
of government enforcement actions may last as long as twenty
years.290
Another area of coverage that needs to become mandatory
for large corporations is the coverage of damages arising from
SMBs.291 SMBs are the biggest vulnerabilities large companies
have.292 Part of the reason is that they face precisely the same
threat landscape that confronts larger organizations, but must
do so with far fewer resources.293 The fact that SMBs face
threats that can endanger large corporations with limited
resources is made worse by the fact that SMBs tend to lack
sufficient in-house expertise.294
Insurance companies that insure large corporations should
be concerned with SMBs because [m]any SMBs have direct
and indirect business relationships with larger organizations, a
fact well known to cybercriminals.295 SMBs become a
cybercriminals gateway to access larger organizations.296
However, large corporations often overlook the vulnerabilities
opened up by SMBs.297 For example, cybercriminals accessed
Targets system after penetrating the network of the small
heating and air conditioning business that services Target.298
For an SMB, a data breach can be more impactful to the
288. SeeWELLS ET AL., supra note 12, at § 29.01[2][a][iii].
289. Id.
290. See id. at § 29.01[2][b][ii] (showing that these requirements may
incentivize companies to settle for large sums of money in the event of a data
breach, such as when TJ Maxx was the victim of cyber-attacks).
291. See AGUILAR, supra note 62.
292. See id. (stating that SMBs are often victims of cyber-attacks in an
attempt to gain access to larger companies that they conduct business with).
293. Id.
294. See id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
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business than it would be for a larger corporation.299 It is
estimated that 72% of SMBs that suffer major data loss shut
down within twenty-four months.300 Mandatory coverage would
be essential for SMBs that deal with large corporations that
maintain personally identifiable information, payment card
information, or protected health information.301
The coverage would either be a flat overall limit, as in
automobile insurance,302 or a limit placed on each record
exposed. The unique characteristic of data breaches is that a
massive amount of data is usually exposednot any particular
piece. Recent studies have shown that the cost of a lost or
stolen sensitive or confidential record averages around $154
per record.303 For large corporations, a data breach may affect
seventy million households and millions of small businesses.304
The Target breach was estimated to be as high as 110 million
affected customers.305 Since one purpose of mandatory cyber-
insurance is to protect the victimized consumers, the policy
coverage should be based on the price per record.306 Although
other factors such as legal fees and other damages should be
factored in, the price per record evaluation would assure that
each victim is considered for redress.307
B. OBSTACLES
One obstacle to instituting a mandatory cyber-liability
insurance regime is the level of concern companies attribute to
cyber risks.308 It is not uncommon for those who professionally
299. Id. (stating that it is becoming increasingly difficult for SMBs to
recover from an attack).
300. See Carrie E. Scope & Ian Reynolds, Breaking Bad in Cyber Space: A
Challenge for the Insurance Industry, 2015 EMERGING ISSUES 7296 (2015).
301. See id. (showing that in 2013, 61% of cyber-attacks targeted
businesses with fewer than 2500 employees).
302. WELLS ET AL., supra note 12, at § 29.01.
303. PONEMON INST., 2015 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY: GLOBAL
ANALYSIS 2 (May 2015), http://public.dhe.ibm.com/common/ssi/ecm/se/en
/sew03053wwen/SEW03053WWEN.PDF.
304. Id. (The JP Morgan Chase & Co. data breach affected 76 million
households and seven million small businesses.).
305. Shinder, supra note 264.
306. See id. (stating that the average cost per record in 2014 was $201).
307. Id. (showing that this analysis of cost factored in both the direct and
indirect costs of data breaches such as the value of customer loss).
308. SINGER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 37.
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think and talk about cybersecurity [to] worry that their
discussions of threats are ignored or downplayed.309 Those who
downplay the seriousness of cyber risks will deem a mandatory
policy unnecessary.310 Such an argument may have been true
five years ago, but it no longer is today. The demand for cyber-
liability coverage currently outstrips supply.311 It is reported
that Target couldnt find adequate coverage for cyber losses.312
Although Target did eventually find coverage, the policy will
barely take care of an anticipated $1 billion in losses.313 The
Target breach demonstrates that demand is no longer the
problem in insuring companies against cyber riskit is now an
issue of quality of supply.314
Another objection to making cyber-insurance mandatory is
that the development of sufficient coverage is still too
premature. Currently, insurers have little historical
information to draw on with respect to the frequency, severity
and scope of data breaches, or other cyber-related losses,
sustained by various industries for underwriting purposes.315
Although more studies and data are being collected about cyber
risk, the information is broad and not industry-specific.316
Industry-specific information is important because of the
industry-specific risks, which are dependent on the type of
information being stored and protected.317 For example,
ransomware is unique to PHI, which places hospitals at risk of
becoming victims of ransomware.318
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. See Aliya Sternstein, WH Official: Cyber Coverage Will Be a Basic
Insurance Policy by 2020, NEXTGOV (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.nextgov.com
/cybersecurity/2014/09/wh-official-cyber-coverage-will-be-basic-insurance-
policy-2020/93503/.
312. Id.
313. Id. (stating that at least one carrier rejected the retailer in its
pursuit of finding cyber risk coverage).
314. Id. (explaining that before the Target breach, insurance companies
didnt have enough data on breaches to determine what the costs of a policy
should be, but that data is now forthcoming).
315. Scope & Reynolds, supra note 300, at 7.
316. See id.
317. Id. (stating that this information is becoming more readily available
as state laws on these matters change).
318. See id. at 5 (adding that small businesses are also especially
susceptible to ransomware).
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A likely and difficult obstacle may come from the insurance
companies themselves.319 Historically, the insurance industry
has been adamantly opposed to any kind of compulsory
insurance because it fears there would be associated regulation
of the insurance itself.320 The insurance industry heavily
opposed compulsory automobile insurance since the laws
inception in the 1920s.321 Insurance companies like to have
freedom in determining the terms of their policies without
government oversight, which is lost in a compulsory regime.322
Legislatures usually demand minimal coverage requirements
in mandatory coverage.323
C. OVERCOMING OBSTACLES
In recognizing the complex issues involved in
cybersecurity, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) created a special taskforce to coordinate
insurance issues in cybersecurity.324 This taskforce will help
cyber risk insurers create coverage by providing the much
needed data.325 The NAIC taskforce seeks to (a) monitor
developments in the area of cybersecurity; (b) advise, report
and make recommendations to the Executive Committee on
cybersecurity issues; [and] (c) coordinate activities with the
NAIC standing committees and their tasks forces and working
groups regarding cybersecurity issues.326
The taskforce released twelve guiding principles that it
believes will improve cybersecurity in the insurance industry,
and may help in overcoming obstacles to an effective
mandatory regime.327 One aspect mentioned in improving the
319. Harvey, supra note 177.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See, e.g., id. (giving no fault car insurance as an example of a minimal
coverage requirement demanded by legislature).
324. See Press Release, NAIC, Insurance Regulators Establish Cyber
Security Task Force (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.naic.org/Releases/2014_docs
/insurance_regulators_establish_cybersecurity_task_force.htm.
325. Id.
326. 2016 Adopted Committee Charges, NAIC (Aug. 29, 2016), http://www
.naic.org/documents/index_committees_2016_committee_charges.pdf.
327. NATL ASSOC. OF INS. COMMRS, PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE
CYBERSECURITY: INSURANCE REGULATORY GUIDANCE (2015), http://www.naic
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state of cyber-liability insurance is the involvement of
regulators.328 The NAIC hopes that the involvement of
regulators would identify uniform standards, promote
accountability across the insurance sector, and provide access
to essential information in order to identify risks and offer
practical solutions.329 A mandatory cyber-insurance regime
cannot be done with just the regulators and it cannot be done
solely by the insurance companiesit must be a joint effort.330
CONCLUSION
Implementing a mandatory cyber risk regime protects at-
risk corporations and the public at large. The importance of
having coverage increases as cyber threats evolve and more
personal and financial information is stored. With data
breaches becoming more frequent and more damaging with
each passing year, the importance of state-of-the-art
cybersecurity and prevention measures only increases.
Furthermore, like automobile insurance, mandatory cyber-
insurance assures that victims will be properly compensated in
the event their personal and financial information is
inadvertently exposed. All parties ultimately benefit from a
compulsory cyber-insurance regime.
.org/documents/committees_ex_cybersecurity_tf_final_principles_for_cybersec
urity_guidance.pdf.
328. Id. at 1.
329. See id.
330. Id. (showing that a joint effort is the most effective solution).
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